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In line with the literature that considers that transaction costs, asset speci-
ficity and incomplete contracts play a key role in the “make or buy decision”,
this paper seeks to identify the characteristics of offshoring firms that make
them more or less likely to integrate their activities in a foreign country. Our
results show that the real candidates for foreign vertical integration are those
firms that have a large share of their inputs provided by headquarters. Firms
engaged in foreign vertical integration are more capital and skill-intensive
than those exclusively dedicated to foreign outsourcing. The degree of for-
eign vertical integration also matters since the most intensively integrated
firms are also the most productive. We also demonstrate that international
experience and product differentiation favor foreign vertical integration.
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G lobalization and easy access to information and communication technologiesallow firms to organize their activity and choose their production strategiesin a global framework [UNCTAD (2004)]. The goal of modern sourcingstrategies is to obtain the optimum combination of inputs from a variety ofopportunities available in the global market. Both the location factor and the
choice between the internalization or externalization of the means of procurement will
vary with circumstances and will change over time [Buckley and Ghauri (2004)].
The sourcing of intermediate goods and services provides firms with a decision
making challenge [Grossman and Helpman (2002), Antràs and Helpman (2004),
Helpman (2006)]. The firm has to consider two dimensions: the first is the way of
sourcing –the producer must decide whether to undertake the activity in-house or pur-
chase the input or service from outside, through the market (at arm’s length); the sec-
ond is geography– that is, whether production can be performed domestically or in
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suggestions. We thank the Generalitat of Catalonia (2014SGR420) for its support. We are very gra -
teful for the suggestions and comments from two anonymous referees that were very useful for im-
proving the paper.
a foreign country. The interaction of these two dimensions leads to four possibili-
ties: insource at home, outsource at home (where both possibilities concern domestic
activity), insource abroad or outsource abroad (where both possibilities concern off-
shoring activity).
This paper examines the characteristics of offshoring firms that make them more
or less likely to integrate their activities in a foreign country (insource abroad), by
exploiting a unique firm-level offshoring dataset. The data we employ are drawn from
a longitudinal survey of Spanish manufacturing firms (Survey on Business Strate-
gies, ESEE). The dataset comprises more than 8,000 observations, corresponding to
an average of 2,015 firms per year during the period 2006 to 2009. This survey fur-
nishes an extraordinary opportunity to test the predictions made in the literature re-
garding foreign vertical integration.
The contribution of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the charac-
teristics of offshoring firms that can influence the adoption of a foreign vertical in-
tegration strategy. Employing various strands of the literature, we investigate the role
that intensity in headquarter services [Antràs and Helpman (2004)], international ex-
perience [Caves (2007)] and product differentiation [Grossman and Helpman (2002)]
play in offshoring sourcing strategies. During recent decades Spain has been an im-
portant host country for affiliates of multinational companies [Pelegrín (2002),
Pelegrín and Bolance (2008)]. Venables et al. (2000) show that from the late 1970s
to the late 1990s Spain’s share of all EU manufacturing stood at 6.5%. A large pro-
portion of foreign firms that entered Spain in the 1980s are now offshoring [Myro
and Fernandez-Otheo (2008)].
This paper makes the following contributions to the current empirical literature:
first, factors that impact on a firm’s offshoring foreign vertical integration, especially
intensity in headquarter services, have received little attention to date in the empir-
ical literature. Although a number of recent papers, including Corcos et al. (2012),
Federico (2012) and Jabbour (2012) do address this issue, here we use a full set of
variables that strengthen considerably the analysis that headquarter services play in for-
eign vertical integration. Second, although some evidence has been reported to illus-
trate the relationship between offshoring and international experience, most empirical
studies have focused their attention on offshoring [Tomiura (2005), Görg, Hanley and
Strobl, (2008) and Wagner (2010)], albeit not specifically on foreign vertical integra-
tion. The availability of empirical studies that analyze how international business ex-
perience impacts the probability of foreign vertical integration activities is still very
limited. Third, the issue of differentiation has not been sufficiently analyzed elsewhere
in the field. Here, however, the availability of information enables us to test whether
differentiation is a determinant of foreign vertical integration strategy. Fourth, our
dataset provides a unique opportunity to analyze the characteristics of firms involved
in offshoring activities distinguishing those that engage in foreign outsourcing from
those involved in foreign vertical integration. To date very few studies have enjoyed
access to this degree of information disaggregation. A notable exception is Jabbour
(2010) who considers the effect of offshoring on a firm’s productivity and profitabil-
ity using a survey that also permits the governance mode to be identified. Fifth, our
results show that it is important to distinguish between the decision (extensive mar-
gin) and the intensity of foreign vertical integration (intensive margin).
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In line with most recent empirical studies we conduct our analysis at the firm level.
Antràs and Helpman (2004) assume that capital/labor intensity are determined by in-
dustry factors but, as Tomiura et al. (2011) show, substantial differences are to be found
in capital intensity between firms within the same industry. Indeed, firm level analy-
sis seems particularly appropriate for studying offshoring “make or buy decisions”
given the degree of variation in a number of key firm characteristics, including capi-
tal intensity and skill intensity [Corcos et al. 2012)]. Greenaway and Kneller (2007)
also conclude that the combination of sunk costs and the heterogeneity in the under-
lying characteristics of firms accounts for differences in their globalization strategies.
Finally, this paper controls for headquarter firms. Our firm level data provide
information related to equity participation by other companies, thereby enabling us
to build a restricted sample of Spanish-owned firms. This is a notable step forward
given that most studies of foreign sourcing fail to take this distinction into account,
with the exception of the recent contributions of Kohler and Smolka (2011) and Nunn
and Trefler (2012).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 reviews the main theoret-
ical approaches and the empirical literature, Section 2 describes the database and out-
lines the econometric methodology and Section 3 reports the estimation results and
discussion. The paper ends with a summary and conclusions.
1. OFFSHORE SOURCING STRATEGIES
In the literature examining the determinants of multinational activity, Dunning’s
eclectic paradigm suggests that an enterprise’s foreign direct investment (FDI) is de-
termined by three types of potential advantage: ownership, location and internal-
ization (otherwise referred to as the OLI-Framework) (Dunning, 1981). In other
words, FDI is determined, first, by the extent to which an enterprise possesses net
ownership advantages [Hymer (1960)]; second, by the perceived profitability of lo-
cating its production units either at home or abroad [Vernon (1966)]; and, third, by
the degree to which it can either internalize these advantages or leave them for other
enterprises to exploit [Buckley and Casson (1976)]. An alternative view points to a
recent change in the motives underpinning FDI: namely, the growth in strategic as-
set-seeking. This strategy aims to protect or increase the investing firm’s ownership
advantage rather than to exploit it as traditional FDI does [Dunning (1998)].
Offshoring would appear both to reaffirm and to challenge the OLI framework.
In Doh’s (2005) opinion, location is prominent among the apparent motivations for
offshoring, but the relevance of ownership and internalization is less evident – “By
disintegrating production stages along the supply chain and transferring them to other
locations, firms may create conditions for the erosion of ownership and internal-
ization advantages” (p. 698).
Offshoring is not costless. Vertical fragmentation of production incurs sub-
stantial costs of coordination between the headquarters and its foreign affiliates, or
independent suppliers. Drawing on Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, Kedia & Mukher-
jee (2009) provide a theoretical framework for a firm’s offshoring decisions. The au-
thors suggest that firms go offshore when they perceive three types of related ad-
vantages: first, advantages derived from the disintegration of value chain activities,
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since disintegration reduces the coordination costs associated with hierarchical
governance, allows the firm to focus on its core activities and provides the firm with
more flexibility; second, location-specific resourcing advantages, which are specific
to a country and external to the firm, similar in this regard to the traditional coun-
try-level advantages identified by Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, and human-capital-
specific advantages; and, third, externalization-related advantages, involving exter-
nalization to independent foreign providers versus internalization via FDI.
Firms will tend to internalize whenever the costs of carrying out transactions
(such as organization, management, and supply) are lower than the costs of subcon-
tracting these transactions via the market. So, the decision of whether to internalize
production or to subcontract externally (i.e., make or buy) depends on the costs and
benefits associated with each alternative, where the factors influencing the decision
are related to production and transaction costs – that is, the costs involved in identi-
fying a suitable supplier, management costs, design costs and control of contracts
(which tend to be imperfect), costs of coordinating the production process and the risk
of transmitting strategic knowledge, which can generate opportunistic behaviour.
Grossman and Helpman (2002), Antràs (2003), Antràs and Helpman (2004) and
Helpman (2006) consider transaction costs, asset specificity and incomplete contracts
as playing an important role in the “make or buy decision”. Thus, explanations of qual-
itative and quantitative changes in foreign trade and in FDI focus their attention on
the organizational strategies adopted by firms and attempt to determine what activi-
ties are carried out within firms (foreign subsidiaries) as opposed to through market
transactions (international outsourcing) and the reasons underpinning their choices.
The general principles of integration point to market failure, bargaining problems and
dynamic aspects including entry deterrence [Casson (1986), Buckley (2011)].
As foreign vertically integrated firms can be seen simply as vertically integrated
firms whose production units are located abroad, theoretical models of vertical in-
tegration should be equally applicable [Caves (2007)]. Coase’s (1937) seminal work
observed that as firms grow the cost of organizing additional transactions increases
and so the loss in resources will be greater than the cost of completing the transac-
tion through the market.
Taking Coase’s main principles as his starting point, Williamson (1975, 1985)
examines the nature and determinants of transaction costs. Transaction costs make
any real contract inevitably incomplete and, as such, it must be renegotiated and ex
post adaptation will be necessary. Such contractual limitations can lead to problems,
such as delivery delays (holdups). As Kedia and Mukherjee (2009) emphasize,
these costs can increase substantially when a firm is operating in a foreign country.
Based on Williamson’s work, Grossman and Hart (1986) developed the prop-
erty rights approach (or incomplete contracts approach), which is concerned with
costly contracts. Their theory stresses that ownership provides the power to exercise
control through all aspects of the asset not made explicit in the contract. Integration
is optimal when production is intensive in the input that the firm owns and it is too
difficult to specify all the particular characteristics that the asset possesses. In this
case subcontracting in the market means giving the external supplier the power to
threaten the firm by withholding its assets.
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The study of the determinants of decisions that requires the fragmentation of
production and the mode of governance has been a fruitful line of research. In Wi -
lliamson (2005) asset specificity is relevant in determining the mode of governan -
ce. As the degree of asset specificity increases, bilateral dependency (between the
contractor and supplier) also increases, which when combined with the uncertainty
of incomplete contracts makes vertical integration more pervasive. Internalization
occurs when the degree of asset specificity and uncertainty becomes so high that the
parties need a high level of cooperation and adaptation.
Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman’s (2004) formal models provide hy-
potheses regarding the relationship between foreign sourcing and a firm’s characteris-
tics. Antràs (2003) interprets a multinational firm’s inputs in terms of capital and de-
velops a model in which foreign vertical integration of suppliers occurs mostly in
capital-intensive industries. In Antràs and Helpman (2004), a multinational firm’s in-
put is referred to as headquarter services, and the hypothesis implies that FDI is most
prevalent in industries in which headquarter services, such as R&D, are most intensive.
Antràs and Helpman (2004) assume a hierarchical order for the fixed costs as-
sociated with sourcing activities. Organizational forms are faced by two tensions: the
first concerns location, where fixed costs are higher for foreign sourcing than for do-
mestic sourcing; the second concerns the governance mode, where fixed costs are
higher for insourcing than they are for outsourcing.
Antràs and Helpman’s model predicts the different sourcing choices based on
a firm’s productivity. Thus, the most productive firms pursue foreign vertical inte-
gration while firms with high productivity engage in foreign outsourcing to an un-
related supplier. In their sector analysis, the prevalence of organizational forms de-
pends on the industry characteristics and the degree of productivity dispersion
across firms: in component intensive sectors (with very low intensity of headquar-
ter services) no firms integrate. In headquarter intensive sectors all organizational
forms are possible, but integration is more prevalent in sectors with higher firm pro-
ductivity and in those with higher headquarter intensity. As a result, only the most
productive firms capture the market share required to offset the high costs of verti-
cal integration, but not all candidates for vertical integration will in fact integrate.
The real candidates for vertical integration will be highly productive firms, with a
large share of their inputs being provided by their headquarters.
Firms tend to externalize non-core activities to independent suppliers while re-
tain control over the activities and processes that create the most value [Kedia and
Mukherjee (2009), Liesch et al. (2012)]. Products which should not be outsourced
include those were protection of intellectual property is decisive, those with high
technology content and those related with corporate responsibility [Buckley (2011)].
Taking these studies as our starting point, we expect foreign vertical integration to
be more pervasive the greater the multinational firm’s input intensity is in headquarter
services and the higher its productivity.
The few empirical studies that examine the determinants of foreign vertical in-
tegration at the firm level support the above hypothesis. Some of these papers cen-
ter their attention on intensity in headquarter services and the choice of sourcing
mode. Marin (2006) shows that intra-firm imports between German firms and their
subsidiaries grow when the parent firm is more intensive in headquarter services
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(R&D), while intra-firm imports between Austrian firms and their subsidiaries grow
when the parent firm is more capital intensive and less R&D intensive. Corcos et al.
(2012) find that highly productive, capital and skill-intensive firms favor intra-firm
trade. Ito et al. (2011) examine the influence of knowledge capital on sourcing be-
havior. Their results show that R&D intensity and patenting contribute to offshore
sourcing and increase the probability of engaging in foreign vertical integration as
opposed to outsourcing. Federico (2012) shows that foreign vertical integration is
positively related to a firm’s capital intensity and Jabbour (2012) also reports evi-
dence that the intensity of headquarter services can increase the probability of for-
eign vertical integration at the expense of foreign outsourcing.
Some studies focus primarily on productivity and choice of governance mode.
Tomiura (2007) finds that firms integrating part of their activities abroad are more pro-
ductive than foreign outsourcers and exporters, which in turn are more productive than
domestic firms. Fariñas and Martín-Marcos (2010) conclude that high-productivity
firms source intermediate inputs in international markets, whereas low-productivity
firms acquire them at home. Arnold and Hussinger (2010) point out that German firms
with subsidiaries abroad are generally more productive than either domestically fo-
cused or exporting firms. Federico (2010) and Kohler and Smolka (2011) provide em-
pirical evidence for the sourcing strategies and heterogeneity of firms. Both papers
find that productivity levels are generally higher (lower) for firms pursuing foreign
vertical integration (domestic outsourcing). Kohler and Smolka (2014) find strong ev-
idence that the more productive firms self-select into strategies of vertical foreign in-
tegration. Nevertheless, Jabbour (2012) finds that productivity is not significant
when comparing firms involved in foreign integration with outsourcing firms.
International experience also influences the offshoring mode of the firms. As
the cost of information increases, a firm becomes less willing to acquire it and, hence,
the perceived risk of foreign vertical integration is greater while other options ap-
pear more attractive. The accumulation of foreign experience is costly and as such
international experience represents a transaction cost advantage for multinational
firms. Moreover, firms perform better when they are able to gather information via
a learning process, which usually starts as an extension of domestic activities in sim-
ilar, nearby host countries. Starting with exports, firms can obtain information on
overseas suppliers via their dealings with foreign countries. This information min-
imizes the costs of inexperience when investing in a foreign country. The acquisi-
tion of successive incremental steps in experience has been demonstrated to be a more
successful process than one in which a firm becomes directly involved in a foreign
vertical integration project without previous experience [Caves (2007)].
In particular, multinational companies obtain advantages through both vertical
and horizontal integration. They are able to segment their activities and to seek the
optimal location for each activity [Buckley and Ghauri (2004), Buckley (2009)]. For-
eign firms, which are assumed to be part of larger multinational companies, can be
expected to use higher levels of technology, information and business experience than
those employed by domestic firms because they have easier access to the parent
firm’s specific assets. Supply chain management has emerged as an important fac-
tor in the competitive success of multinational enterprises: a firm’s relationships with
the parent firm and other subsidiaries abroad facilitate the disintegration of production
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structures [Girma and Görg (2004)]. Based on these studies, it is our assertion that
firms with more international business experience can be expected to prefer foreign
vertical integration as their governance mode.
Most empirical studies of international experience have focused their attention
on offshoring, albeit not specifically on foreign vertical integration. Tomiura (2005),
Görg, Hanley and Strobl (2008) and Wagner (2010) show that exports increase the
probability of offshoring activities. Tomiura (2005) also reports empirical evidence
for the offshoring activities of multinationals. His estimations show that firms with
their own overseas affiliates are four times more likely than firms without experience
in FDI to choose foreign offshoring. Empirical evidence of international experience
specifically in sourcing through foreign vertical integration is low. To the best of our
knowledge, only Ito et al. (2011) show a significant positive relationship between
export activity and foreign vertical integration.
Differentiation is also important in foreign “make or buy decisions”. Grossman
and Helpman (2002) identify the industrial conditions that favor vertical integration
or outsourcing as the equilibrium mode of organization, emphasizing technology, the
distribution of bargaining power between intermediate and final goods producers, the
size of the economy and the degree of substitutability between an industry’s con-
sumer products.
Transaction-specific investments tend to be required when the production process
involves non-standardized inputs as is the case of differentiated products [Levy (1985)].
If a firm develops such products, the risk of opportunism increases when it shares this
knowledge with other host country firms, given that the acquisition of this knowledge
might enable the latter to operate independently. This risk of opportunism is especially
significant in the case of international transactions because legal and social systems
may well differ [Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992)]. Therefore, when a firm is able to
differentiate its products, greater control modes may be more efficient.
Product differentiation is also important when a firm has to choose its interna-
tional distribution channel. Foreign vertical integration, as opposed to an indepen-
dent distribution channel, is more profitable for the manufacturer when its final prod-
ucts are highly differentiated, as such products do not compete directly. Indeed,
Coughlan (1985) and Anderson and Coughlan (1987) present evidence of the fact
that highly differentiated products are more likely to be sold through integrated chan-
nels. Taking these findings into account, we would expect a positive relation between
product differentiation and foreign vertical integration. Results for Spanish ex-
porters [Rialp et al. (2002)] also show that firms with differentiated, high-priced prod-
ucts tend to establish independent distribution channels or commercial alliances while
firms that export highly standardized, low priced goods tend to rely on independent
distributors. However, Merino and Salas (2002) find that although asset specificity
and product complexity are positively associated with having an export channel, the
most robust explanatory variable for integrating the export distribution channel is the
volume of exports.
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2. DATA AND MODEL
2.1. Data
The dataset we use is the Survey on Business Strategies (Encuesta Sobre Es-
trategias Empresariales, henceforth ESEE) which has been conducted yearly since
1990 by the SEPI foundation on behalf of the Spanish Ministry of Industry. This sur-
vey gathers information from manufacturing firms operating in Spain employing
more than nine workers. The annual survey comprises extensive information on
around 2,000 companies (see http://www.funep.es/esee/en/ for a more detailed de-
scription of the database). The sampling procedure ensures representativeness for
each two-digit NACE manufacturing sector, following both exhaustive and random
sampling criteria. In the initial year (1990) all firms employing more than 200 em-
ployees were required to participate and a sample of firms employing between 10
and 200 workers was selected using a stratified, proportional, restricted and sys-
tematic sampling method with a random start.
One of the main features of the ESEE is that it provides information based on
longitudinal data, which involve the systematic tracking of changes in firm status. The
survey generates an unbalanced panel and special attention has been paid to preserve
the reliability and consistency of the longitudinal data so as to exploit the advantages
that this type of data has for econometric analyses. Therefore, in order to guarantee
a high level of representativeness and to preserve the inference properties, newly cre-
ated companies have been incorporated in the survey every year according to the same
sampling criteria. This database has been frequently used in empirical analyses [see,
among others, Moreno and Rodríguez (2004) González et al. (2005), Lopez (2008)
and Arqué-Castells (2013)] and also specifically for offshoring and outsourcing
analyses [Fariñas and Marcos (2010), Kohler and Smolka (2011)].
The objective of this study is to provide empirical evidence about the features
of offshoring firms that influence foreign vertical integration. Although the ESEE
survey is particularly useful in this regard, it presents two main limitations: first, we
are unable to study the location choice of the offshoring strategy as the survey pro-
vides no information about exporting countries; second, the survey has only provided
information about offshoring governance modes since 2006. Therefore, for most
firms included, we are unable to determine the year in which the decision was taken
to integrate in a foreign country. So, while we can examine the relationships between
a firm’s characteristics and its offshoring strategy decision, they cannot necessarily
be interpreted as being causal.
The estimations have been carried out with firm-level data from the ESEE data-
base for the period 2006-2009. For this period the database contains 8,060 obser-
vations, including 7,252 observations for firms from the total current sample for all
four years, together with the observations corresponding to new entries in each year
and to a number of firms that were recovered from previous years (for further de-
tails, see the summary table of the sample evolution of the Survey on Business Strate-
gies, available at https://www.fundacionsepi.es/esee/en/evariables/indice.asp).
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2.2. Variables
2.2.1. Dependent variable
In 2006 the ESEE survey first began to incorporate information about the
firms’ organizational dimensions and their location. Here, we are particularly inter-
ested in details related to their offshoring activities. The questionnaire allows us to
distinguish between foreign outsourcing and foreign vertical integration in the fol-
lowing questions:
“Indicate whether during the year (year) the company imported goods and ser-
vices that are incorporated (transformed) in the production process and the percentage
they represent of the total imports, according to type of supplier” (yes/no) (if yes,
the percentage rate).
(1) From firms which belong to the same group and/or foreign firms partici-
pating in the capital of your company (yes/no) (if yes, the percentage rate)
(2) From other foreign firms (yes/no) (if yes, the percentage rate)
This information allows us to identify whether imports are intra-firm (related
party) or at arm’s-length (non-related party) and it enables us to examine the em-
pirical implications of theoretical models of the “make or buy decision”. We con-
struct the dependent variable Foreign vertical integration (FI), which is a binary vari-
able indicating whether the company imported intermediate goods and services from
other companies belonging to its group and/or from foreign companies participat-
ing in the capital of the company. In the database there are 3,570 observations for
offshoring, of these 814 (22.8%) integrate their activities vertically in a foreign coun-
try (see Table 1 for a description of the variables and summary statistics).
2.2.2. Independent variables
Headquarter intensity: The proxies used to reflect headquarter intensity include
R&D, skill intensity, capital intensity, design, marketing, quality control [see Antràs
(2003), Antràs and Helpman (2004), Ito et al. (2011), Nunn and Trefler (2008 and
2011), Corcos et al. (2012) and Jabbour (2012)]. To capture headquarter intensity we
construct the following measures instead of relying on just one: skill intensity; R&D
intensity; capital intensity, patents and quality control. To measure skill intensity we
use the percentage of engineers and graduates in relation to total employment while
R&D intensity is calculated as internal R&D expenditure divided by sales. In line with
Tomiura et al. (2011), capital intensity is defined by the value of tangible assets, ex-
cluding land and buildings, divided by the number of employees. Quality is measured
with a dummy variable related to the firm’s use of quality control procedures.
Productivity: We use labor productivity measured as the value added per worker.
Labor productivity has the advantage of being relatively simple to construct and it is
one of the most frequently used measures in offshoring studies [see Girma and Görg
(2004), Tomiura (2007), Görg, Hanley and Strobl (2008), Görg, Greenaway and
Kneller (2008), Federico (2010), Wagner (2010) and Kohler and Smolka (2011)].
International experience: To capture international experience we construct two
measures: foreign capital participation (Foreign) and export intensity (Export). We
expect foreign capital participation to increase the probability of foreign vertical in-
tegration. Export activity should help to explain the probability of foreign sourcing
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since the level of internationalization and the experience in foreign markets should
reduce transaction costs, thus favoring both foreign vertical integration and foreign
outsourcing [Federico (2012)].
Product differentiation: This is a binary variable indicating the extent to which
the products the company manufactures are differentiated. The variable indicates ei-
ther high differentiation, when some specific investment is needed in order to attend
to customer requirements, or low differentiation, when products are largely standard
for all buyers as the producer has its own product range. Merino and Rodriguez (2007)
and Díaz-Mora and Triguero-Cano (2012) also use this variable as a proxy of prod-
uct differentiation. Although product differentiation might be introduced in other ways,
such as by advertising, in line with Merino and Rodriguez (2007), we consider
adaptation to customer requirements to be a major source of product differentiation.
Finally we include two control variables, Age and Size. The firm’s age, defined
as the number of years since the firm was established, is used to capture the effect
of learning over time, a potential factor facilitating the firm’s foreign operations. Size,
measured as the total number of staff employed, also captures the firms’ hetero-
geneity. As Tomiura (2007) claims large companies, with higher labor productivity,
stronger headquarter functions, distribution networks, higher earnings and brand
identification are more likely to offshore their activities.
Another desirable control variable would have been a proxy for the contracting
environment in the exporting country, as differences across destinations can be crit-
ical in the make or buy choice. Tomiura et al. (2011) consider the choice of offshoring
mode to a given region, and report some remarkable differences between China and
ASEAN countries, on the one hand, and the United States and European countries,
on the other. Corcos et al. (2012) find that intra-firm trade is more likely with coun-
tries that have good judicial institutions, especially in the case of highly productive,
capital-, skill- and headquarter-intensive firms. Yet, for the Spanish case, this infor-
mation is not available, although this absence of a variable for the contracting envi-
ronment in the host country should not be a source of concern, given that Spain’s main
supplier of imports is the European Union (EU) and the top five countries, Germany,
France, Italy, United Kingdom and the Netherlands, present similar institutional en-
vironments and legal systems [Kohler and Smolka (2011)]. Similarly, for the Italian
case, Federico (2012) claims that the contracting environment in the host country is
not a problem as Italy’s foreign suppliers are mainly located in the EU.
2.3. Methodological issues
To carry out the empirical analysis, we use a binary dependent variable (foreign
vertical integration) in a probit estimation.
Prob(foreign vertical integration)it = β0 + β1(headquarter intensity)it +
β2(productivity)it + β3(international experience)it + [1]
β4(differentiation)it + β5(Z)it + εit
The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm inte-
grates its activities in a foreign country and zero otherwise, that is when a firm’s off-
shoring activities only involve foreign outsourcing. The subscript i refers to the unit
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Table 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable Description of the variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
FI Foreign vertical integration. 3570 0.228 0.420
Dummy = 1 if the firm sources abroad
through foreign vertical integration,
0 otherwise.
Skill Skill intensity. Percentage that engineers 3466 7.886 9.627
and graduates represent on the total
personnel of the company.
R&D R&D effort (ratio of internal R&D 3557 0.012 0.0276
expenditure to sales).
Patents Number of patents filed abroad by the 3570 0.697 8.709
company during the year.
Quality Quality control. Dummy=1 if the company 3540 0.501 0.500
has carried out or contracted quality
standardization and control works,
0 otherwise.
Capital Intensity Reported value on the balance sheet of 3567 11.209 1.060
tangible fixed assets (excluding land and
buildings) per employee (in logarithms).
Productivity Value added per hour worked 3534 3.332 0.677
(in logarithms).
Foreign Percentage of direct or indirect foreign 3570 24.81 42.112
capital in the company.
Export Export intensity (ratio of exports to sales). 3566 0.280 0.288
Differentiation Product differentiation. Dummy = 1 3454 0.402 0.490
if most of the products manufactured by
the company are highly differentiated,
0 otherwise.
Size Total number of employees. 3570 345.18 956.17
Age Number of years that the firm has 3466 36.37 21.14
been operating.
Note: Summary statistics are for the sample used in the empirical estimations that only includes
offshoring firms.
Source: Own elaboration.
of analysis, firms, and t represents time. The independent variables are described in
detail above and εi is an error term. As is well known, the estimation of a probit model
is preferable to an OLS estimation when the dependent variable is binary.
A pooled probit estimation has been carried out (Table 2, model 1). Given the
short period of time (four years) covered by the panel, and the fact that the relevant
variation in the data is mostly cross-sectional, panel regression techniques are of lim-
ited use here. Therefore we implement a pooled data estimation over the sample pe-
riod clustering the error terms at firm level to control for intra-firm serial correla-
tion. The variables vary, albeit little, over the four-year time span, so that using a
pooled model is preferable to conducting a cross-sectional analysis as it allows all
the panel observations to be used. This option provides greater degrees of freedom
and more variability and, hence, more efficient estimates. To control for any indus-
try specific characteristics that may affect a firm’s likelihood of integrating its ac-
tivities abroad, a set of industry dummies (19 two-digit dummies) is included in both
regressions. In addition, time dummies are included to control for cyclical effects.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
3.1. Main results
The main results from the estimation are shown in model 1 (Table 2). In this
model we estimate the determinants that make offshoring firms more or less likely
to integrate their activities in a foreign country. Among all the offshoring firms (that
is, foreign vertically integrated firms and foreign outsourcing firms), we consider
firms that import goods and services incorporated in the production process from for-
eign firms belonging to the same group and/or foreign firms participating in the cap-
ital of the company. Therefore our results refer solely to offshoring firms.
The empirical analysis confirms, first, that firms with the highest intensity in
their headquarter services are more likely to be involved in activities of foreign ver-
tical integration than in foreign outsourcing. Of the five variables used to control
headquarter service intensity, the coefficients associated with the capital intensity and
skill variable, which capture human capital, are positive and significant. By contrast,
the variables that capture the research and development activities (R&D and patents)
are not significant.
Our results regarding capital intensity are similar to those obtained in current
empirical studies of the determinants of foreign vertical integration. Tomiura et al.
(2011) and Corcos et al. (2012) report that capital intensive firms are more likely to
engage in foreign vertical integration. Federico (2012), when using a set of variables
to estimate the influence of headquarter intensity on the choice between integration
or outsourcing, reports that the only variable to have a positive and significant in-
fluence on foreign vertical integration is the capital intensity of the firm.
The positive relationship between capital intensity and foreign vertical inte-
gration could also be linked to the kind of activities that have been moved abroad.
With the current database it is very difficult to determine whether higher capital in-
tensity is the result of a characteristic of firms that integrate, as self-selection the-
ory predicts [Antrás and Helpman (2004)] and Kohler and Smolka (2014) find ev-
idence for Spain, or whether it is the result of an ex post effect of moving the more
labour-intensive activities abroad.
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Table 2: PROBIT AND TOBIT ESTIMATIONS
Probit Probit Probit Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES FI FI FI FI (intensity)
Skill 0.0193*** 0.0205*** 0.0210*** 0.736***
[0.00499] [0.00692] [0.00703] [0.226]
R&D 1.068 2.452 1.916 -26.83
[1.668] [1.846] [1.981] [93.62]
Patents 0.000587 -0.00232 -0.00149 0.0513
[0.00400] [0.00429] [0.00436] [0.139]
Quality -0.0178 0.111 0.118 -0.250
[0.0968] [0.132] [0.135] [4.322]
Capital intensity 0.0863* 0.131** 0.116** 1.028
[0.0496] [0.0590] [0.0591] [2.266]
Productivity 0.0763 0.114 0.0747 7.706**
[0.0646] [0.0914] [0.0898] [3.129]
Foreign 0.0183*** 0.00638 0.165 0.809***
[0.00104] [0.00847] [0.148] [0.0500]
Exports 0.472*** 0.635*** 0.630*** 20.45***
[0.159] [0.202] [0.208] [7.431]
Differentiation 0.226** 0.0841 0.0953 7.199
[0.108] [0.153] [0.156] [4.645]
Size 0.000184** 0.000394*** 0.000378*** 0.00455**
[7.66e-05] [0.000134] [0.000136] [0.00192]
Age 0.00111 0.00106 0.00110 0.0208
[0.00249] [0.00331] 0.0210*** [0.100]
Constant -2.961*** -3.974*** -3.687*** -119.2***
[0.555] [0.628] [0.627] [25.95]
Observations 3,214 2,314 2,252 3,343
Wald Chi-squared 497.1 115.1 112.9
Pseudo R_squared 0.398 0.147 0.142 0.131
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All estimations include a complete set of industry (19) and year (3) dummies.
Note: In models 1 and 4 the sample comprises all the offshoring firms. In model 2 the sample is
restricted to offshoring firms with less than 50 per cent foreign capital participation. In model 3 the
sample is restricted to offshoring firms with less than 10 per cent foreign capital.
Source: Own elaboration.
Skill intensity has often been included in estimations of intra-firm characteris-
tics, both at the industry and firm levels, but results have been inconclusive. Corcos
et al. (2012) at the firm level and Bernard et al. (2010) and Nunn and Trefler (2011)
at the industry level find that skilled labor increases the prevalence of intra-firm trade,
while Antràs (2003), at the industry level, finds that human capital is not statistically
significant. In this study our results support a positive relationship between human
capital and foreign vertical integration at the firm level.
Part of the empirical literature reports a positive and significant relationship be-
tween research and development activities and foreign vertical integration. For ex-
ample, Antràs (2003) and Nunn and Trefler (2011) find that, at the industry level,
R&D expenditure increases U.S. intra-firm imports. Ito et al. (2011) report that a
firm’s R&D intensity and patenting are positive and significant increasing the prob-
ability of engaging in foreign vertical integration in order to protect their own tech-
nology. Jabbour (2012) finds that marketing services and industry R&D intensity
(two variables used to proxy headquarter service intensity) appear positive and sig-
nificant. However, Federico (2012) does not obtain significant values for R&D ac-
tivity at either the firm or the industry levels. Our results suggest that human capi-
tal has a stronger influence than R&D activities.
We find that firms involved in foreign vertical integration are no more produc-
tive than the rest of the offshoring firms. Although some theoretical and empirical stud-
ies conclude that firms involved in foreign integration are more productive than firms
involved in foreign outsourcing [Tomiura (2007), Kohler and Smolka (2011), Corcos
et al. (2012) and Federico, (2012)], our results show that the productivity variable is
not significant. Likewise, Jabbour (2012) finds that productivity is not significant when
comparing firms involved in foreign integration with outsourcing firms. The author
justifies her findings by suggesting that contractual agreements are associated with
higher fixed costs of organization than those associated with foreign vertical inte-
gration, confirming the predictions of Grossman et al. (2005).
Second, international experience is also seen to matter more for foreign verti-
cal integration than for foreign outsourcing, as the coefficients associated with both
variables (foreign and exports) are positive and significant. The variable that captures
the presence of foreign capital in the company is highly significant demonstrating the
prominence of foreign capital participation among those that engage in foreign ver-
tical integration. The estimations also show a positive association between export in-
tensity and foreign vertical integration. In the estimations we use contemporaneous
values of these variables. As pointed out above, the survey only provides information
about foreign integration since 2006 and so for most firms it is not possible to know
the year in which this decision was taken. However, an alternative specification could
involve using a lag for export intensity so as to control for previous experience in in-
ternational activities. In the results obtained with this specification, the parameter for
the lag of export intensity is positive and significant and the rest of the results hold,
with the same variables as those in the main estimation (Table 2) being significant.
Third, the coefficient of the differentiation variable has a positive sign and is sig-
nificant. Thus, foreign vertical integration is more likely than foreign outsourcing when
a firm develops differentiated products that require a superior relationship between par-
ent and subsidiary and specific assets (for example, marketing, brand, technology, qual-
ity, etc.) that are better protected against imitation within the firm’s boundaries.
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Of the control variables, firm size is relevant in foreign vertical integration al-
though the calculation of the marginal effects suggests that the magnitude of the ef-
fect of size is small. Tomiura (2007) points out that larger firms have a greater ca-
pacity to cope with the higher costs of foreign vertical integration. Firms need asset
power to engage in international expansion, which is costly and size reflects the ca-
pability of a firm to absorb these costs. Tomiura et al. (2011) note that large firms
may prefer integrated sourcing based on their rich internal resources within multi-
nationals, and they report that exclusively insourcing firms are significantly larger
than exclusively outsourcing firms.
3.2. Robustness checks
To verify the robustness of our results we carried out three complementary es-
timations. In the first two, we estimate foreign vertical integration using a restricted
sample of Spanish-owned firms (Table 2 models 2 and 3), in the last estimation we
consider intensity (or intensive margin) instead of participation (or extensive mar-
gin) as the dependent variable (Table 2 model 4).
In the theoretical models the strategic decision as to whether to make or buy is
taken by the parent company, which imports the intermediate inputs produced in the
country of one of its foreign subsidiaries (that is, companies whose capital is more
than 50 per cent controlled by a foreign company, the parent company). As Nunn and
Trefler (2011) point out, it could be the case that these imports were shipped from
a foreign parent to a subsidiary. Empirical studies usually lack such information,
which is critical if firm level variables are related to intensity in headquarter services.
Jabbour (2012) considers this to be especially important in the case of firms affili-
ated to a group, as it is difficult to know if the decision maker is the parent firm or
the firm conducting the trade transaction.
Our data, in line with Kohler and Smolka (2011), provide information related
to equity participation by other companies, enabling us to build a restricted sample
of Spanish-owned firms. Note, we assume the decision maker to be the headquar-
ter or parent firm; we do not take into account foreign subsidiaries located in Spain,
although some groups provide autonomy to the affiliates located in Spain it is dif-
ficult to discriminate between subsidiaries, so we do not consider them to be deci-
sion makers. This is a marked improvement, as most foreign sourcing studies do not
take this difference into account.
To control for headquarter firms, we assume that firms with more than 50 per
cent of national capital are the ones that take the sourcing decisions, and we run two
Probit estimations (Table 2 models 2 and 3): the first considering firms with less than
50 per cent of foreign capital participation, and the second reducing this threshold
control value to less than 10 per cent of foreign capital participation. As Table 2 shows
the number of observations falls from 2,314 in model 2 when considering firms with
less than 50 per cent of foreign capital participation to 2,252 in model 3 when con-
sidering firms with less than 10 per cent of foreign capital participation. The dif-
ference is very small (the reduction being just 62 observations), which suggests that
once a firm is controlled by domestic capital the rate of control becomes very high.
Our results for this restricted sample (Table 2 models 2 and 3), show some dif-
ferences from those for the general model 1. First, we confirm that firms more in-
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tensive in headquarter services are also more likely to engage in foreign vertical in-
tegration activities than are foreign outsourcing firms, with skill and capital inten-
sity showing positive and significant coefficients. Second, the coefficient associated
with the differentiation variable is no longer significant. In this sense, it should be
noted that our variable, which proxies differentiation, only captures product adapt-
ability to the client and not differentiation understood in a much broader sense.
Highly detailed information would be needed to explain these differences in the main
estimation and in that for just domestic headquarter firms.
Third, the results for Spanish-owned firms also show that international experi-
ence, measured by export intensity, is positive and significant. However, the inten-
sity of foreign participation is no longer significant. Hence, when the domestic cap-
ital is dominant then the intensity of foreign capital participation is not a particularly
notable characteristic of firms involved in foreign vertical integration activities. These
results suggest that minority foreign capital is not relevant as a supplier of interna-
tional experience, since it is the domestic headquarter which provides the interna-
tional business experience.
Finally, in the last estimation (Table 2 model 4) we use the intensity of foreign
vertical integration measured as the percentage of total imports represented by im-
ports of intermediate goods and services from foreign companies belonging to the
firm’s group and/or foreign companies participating in the capital of the company. The
estimation has been carried out using a Tobit model because the dependent variable
ranges between 0 and 100 per cent. The results largely confirm those obtained for the
main estimation (Table 2 model 1), with the exception of the coefficients associated
with the productivity variable, which is now significant, and the capital intensity vari-
able, which is no longer significant. These results suggest that the most intensive for-
eign vertically integrated firms are also the most productive of the offshoring firms
and that capital intensity matters particularly for the integration decision, but not as
far as the intensity of integration is concerned. The positive relationship between pro-
ductivity and foreign vertical integration could also be linked to the kind of activities
that have been moved abroad, as it is very difficult to determine whether higher pro-
ductivity comes from the characteristics of firms that integrate [Antrás and Helpman
(2004)] or whether it is the result of an ex post effect of moving the more labour-in-
tensive activities abroad, as some empirical papers prove [Feenstra and Hanson
(2001), Görg et al. (2008), Wagner (2010), Fariñas and Martín-Marcos (2010)].
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has undertaken an analysis of the characteristics of offshoring firms
that make them more or less likely to integrate their activities in a foreign country.
We examine the role that intensity in headquarter services, productivity levels,
multinational experience and product differentiation play in vertical integration
sourcing mode. The dataset we employ comprises a longitudinal survey of Spanish
manufacturing firms drawn from the Survey on Business Strategies (ESEE) for the
period 2006 to 2009. The analysis is conducted at the firm level.
The main conclusions from the empirical analysis are as follows. First, our es-
timations confirm that the real candidates for foreign vertical integration are those
firms that have a large share of their inputs provided by headquarters. Firms engaged
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in foreign vertical integration are more capital and skill-intensive than those exclu-
sively dedicated to foreign outsourcing. Our results support a positive and highly sig-
nificant relationship between skill levels and foreign vertical integration. These re-
sults also hold for Spanish-owned firms, whose capital and skill have a strong
influence on their foreign vertical integration strategy. Moreover, capital intensity fa-
vors the establishment of a related-company, but it has no impact on the intensity of
foreign vertical integration once the latter has been established.
The results related to productivity suggest that firms involved in foreign vertical
integration are no more productive than outsourcing firms but that intensity matters,
as the most intensive foreign vertically integrated firms are also the most productive.
Second, firms with international experience, including firms with foreign capi-
tal participation and export firms, are more likely to engage in foreign vertical inte-
gration – in the case of subsidiaries, because they enjoy easier access to the interna-
tional experience of the foreign parent; and, in the case of exporting firms, because
their foreign market experience facilitates access to overseas information. The ac-
quisition of international business experience is a costly learning process, making the
course of international expansion highly path dependent [Caves (2007)]. Firms with-
out any foreign market experience are likely to face greater problems when attempt-
ing to manage their foreign operations, thereby reducing the likelihood of their en-
gaging in foreign vertical integration activities. Our results for Spanish headquarter
show that the intensity of foreign participation is not significant. This result suggests
that international business experience is an intangible asset related to ownership.
Third, our results regarding the role of differentiated products are inconclusive.
In the general estimation (Table 2 model 1) differentiation appears to be a relevant
characteristic of firms engaging in foreign vertical integration. This suggests that the
risk of opportunism in international transactions is high for these firms [Agarwal and
Ramaswami (1992)]. However, this is not the case for firms operating as Spanish
headquarter, where the variable capturing differentiation is not significant.
Our results suggest that only firms with very specific characteristics are able to
take advantage of foreign vertical integration. These firms tend to be intensive in their
headquarter services and they strive to retain control over their ownership specific
advantages. At the same time they are companies with sufficient international expe -
rien ce to be able to reduce their transaction costs. Without these conditions, the chances
of success of a foreign vertical integration strategy are low and other sourcing op-
tions are better, or more efficient.
In this paper we have focused our attention on the characteristics of the firms
that are most prevalent in the foreign vertical integration governance mode. How-
ever, a number of interesting points remain to be addressed in future studies. First,
a better understanding is needed of the characteristics of the exporting country and
the attributes of the imported inputs that determine the foreign sourcing strategy in
the light of existing literature on incomplete contracts. Second, the contracting en-
vironment in the exporting country and the associated governance mode is an addi-
tional aspect to investigate, as empirical evidence to date is limited and largely in-
conclusive. A third aspect of interest concerns the determinants of foreign vertical
integration at firm level and its ex-post effects. To further our understanding here
would require a larger database so that we might establish the point in time when
the firm establishes a foreign subsidiary.
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RESUMEN
De acuerdo con la literatura que considera que los costes de transacción,
la especificidad de los activos y los contratos incompletos juegan un papel
clave en las decisiones sobre “producir o contratar”, este trabajo examina
que características de las empresas que realizan actividades de offshoring
inciden en la propensión a integrar sus actividades en el exterior. Los re-
sultados muestran que las empresas candidatas a integrar verticalmente sus
operaciones en el exterior mantienen un elevado porcentaje de inputs in-
termedios subministrados por su empresa matriz. Las empresas intensivas
en capital físico y humano son más propensas a la integración vertical que
al outsourcing. En referencia a la productividad el grado de integración es
relevante, ya que las compañías más integradas verticalmente son también
las más productivas. Los resultados también muestran que la experiencia
internacional y la diferenciación de producto favorecen la integración ver-
tical en el exterior.
Palabras clave: offshoring, integración vertical.
Clasificación JEL: L23, F23, D21.
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